

will be mainly useful for readers who are already acquainted with some of Barth's works, and who want a synoptic Barth's-eye view of the whole. Why "Theory and Practice"? Because the book outlines not only the theoretical fundamentals of Barthian theology, but also the personal attitudes and the existential problems which arise in the practice of Barthian theology.

Thus this book is likely to be of interest to theologians rather than to philosophers *qua* philosophers. It is true that some of Barth's writings are of philosophical interest, in spite of his own attempt to provide a theology which is unadulterated by any adulterous and idolatrous union with philosophy; for example, in his *Church Dogmatics*, I, 1, §§ 1, II and V, he presents a (philosophical?) theory of Christian religious language (divine word and human word) which deserves careful philosophical scrutiny, especially in relation to J. L. Austin's theory of "performatives" in everyday language. In *Evangelical Theology* however, Barth's linguistic theory is sketched rather than expounded, and so are his theories of revelation, miracle and faith.

Some philosophers may merely want to fill in a gap in their knowledge of the contemporary intellectual world by reading an introduction to the ideas of the world's leading Protestant theologian. They would do better to read Helmut Gollwitzer's selections from Barth's *Church Dogmatics* (T. & T. Clark paper-back, 1967). Then they might turn to *Evangelical Theology*.

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*INTRODUCTORY FORMAL LOGIC OF MATHEMATICS*, by  
B. H. NIDDITCH, University Tutorial Press, 1957, pp. vi, 100.

This book is designed, we are told, as a text for the second year high school student and is the beginning of a multi-volumed text for the mathematician. As a text, it will hardly suit most philosophers, at least because it is totally biased towards mathematics. In this latter regard it has an amusing, and useful, twist. Professor Nidditch starts from the position that "in the whole literature of mathematics there is not a single valid proof in the logical sense", and this statement, as he points out, involves only "minute exaggerations". His aim in the present book is to "show concretely how to make mathematics a deductive science, i.e. a science in which proofs are genuine deductions, as against the usual, informal, incomplete, intuitive arguments that pass for such".

It is a pleasure to see mathematics so chastised after some of the chastisement philosophy has taken from practitioners of the 'exact sciences'. However the fireworks are soon over and we are asked to consider a series of exact and exacting theorems in set and function theory. Nidditch uses methods of proof based on the work of Jaśkowski and Gentzen, which makes for some strikingly elegant proofs once the symbolism is mastered. However his habit of putting the justifications for the formulae at the bottom of the proof necessitates having, not two, but three hands in the careful reading of any of the longer proofs, which is an inconvenience. I have no hesitation in recommending this book highly to mathematicians; it is to be hoped that it will not only interest them but also do their souls good.

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Dialogue, vol. II, no 4 (1964), p. 487-488.

*L'ÊTRE ET LA VÉRITÉ CHEZ HEIDEGGER ET SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN*. By BERTRAND RIOUX. Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1963. Pp. xi, 270.

Since his writings bore the mark of his early interest in medieval philosophy, Heidegger was the object of critical study by Thomists almost from the outset of his career. Many of the early Thomistic studies were confused by the stress upon time and the human condition in *Being and Time*, and hence treated this philosophy as an anthropological phenomenism. The situation did not improve very much at the time when Heidegger began releasing the great stream of minor writings which brought out the ontological aim of his thought. For these writings also contained his attack upon the metaphysical tradition of the West for having strayed away from the problem of being. Even granting that his intention was to make a new beginning of ontology, still the comprehensive inclusion of all previous types of metaphysics within his critical net led many Thomists to conclude that they could not engage in philosophical dialogue with Heidegger.

Rioux's book is a clear proof that this discouraging verdict was premature. He does lay down two conditions for making a comparative study, however, and shows the wisdom of operating within them. Comparative work depends, first, upon returning resolutely to Thomas and Heidegger in themselves rather than in their school followers, and then upon confining one's analysis to a definite but important problem. The choice of the problem of truth is a happy one, since both

philosophers are deeply concerned with the meaning of being in function of the meaning of truth. Hence they composed their respective treatises *De Veritate* and *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, and impregnated their other books with the relationship between being and truth. Furthermore, Heidegger read the treatise of Aquinas on truth and devoted some classes to a commentary on it. Thus the approach taken by Rioux is a natural one which has a good basis in the texts.

The first two parts of the book give an exposition of Heidegger's theory of truth, while the last part is reserved for the Thomistic view of truth. This proportioning of space is significant, since it indicates that the study is being done by one of our contemporaries and not by a medieval thinker: Heidegger furnishes the spur to the investigation. Yet even apart from the comparative aim, the sections devoted to Heidegger are valuable in themselves as a sympathetic and unified exposition of his central thoughts on truth. The main division of the exposition corresponds roughly to the difference in perspective when Heidegger goes from *Being and Time* to the later opuscles. Understandably, the analysis of Aquinas is not as exhaustive and not quite as penetrating as the analysis of Heidegger. There are many reaches of the Thomistic theory which simply do not come into view, when the comparative framework exerts its influence. But the main lines of this conception of being and truth are presented and given their comparative signification.

Rioux brings out nicely the points of likeness between the two men. They agree upon the openness of man's being to that of other things, upon a capital difference between being itself and the things that are, upon the correlation between the open nature of the human spirit and the presence of being, and hence upon the infrangible bond between a comprehending truth and the mystery of being. The author remarks that it is unfair of Heidegger to hold that all previous philosophers obscured the difference between being and the things that are, since Aquinas emphasizes the distinctive act of being as the ontological basis of the things that are.

In a measured conclusion, the author continues this line of criticism at two crucial points. First, he notes that Heidegger gives up too quickly on the ontological potentiality of the analogy of beings, since he assumes that there can be no other causal relation except that modelled upon the production of one thing that is by another. This leads to the second criticism, since the prime place where another kind of causality is discerned by Aquinas is in the creative action of God, in giving being to things. Transcendence leads Aquinas to that being who is

the identity of openness and presence, spirit and being, whereas Heidegger refuses to admit any thought about God into his philosophy. Rioux has done an excellent piece of comparative philosophizing. On this basis, it may be possible for other figures in the history of philosophy to be engaged in dialogue with Heidegger on the common problems for us all.

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~~APPORTS HISPANIQUES A LA PHILOSOPHIE CHRÉTIENNE  
DEL' OCCIDENT. Par JOAQUIN CARRERAS ARTAU et JUAN TUSQUETS  
TERRATS. Louvain, Publications Universitaires, Paris, Béatrice-  
Nauwelaerts, 1962. 206 pages.~~

~~Titulaires de la chaire Cardinal Mercier en 1960, le prof. Carreras et Mgr. Tusquets ont voulu montrer, dans ces conférences annuelles, un aspect souvent oublié dans les histoires classiques de la philosophie: « les mouvements et personnalités qui, nées en Espagne, ont exercé une influence réelle sur la marche de la pensée européenne. » [10]. On étudie donc à tour de rôle: Pierre d'Espagne, Raymond Lulle, Vivès, Suarez, Balmes et enfin quatre contemporains: Zaragueta, Zubiri, Eugenio d'Ors et Muñoz Alonso. Chaque monographie est suivie d'une courte bibliographie. Ce volume se présente de toute évidence comme une introduction intéressante à certains philosophes, largement méconnus et souvent importants. Il ne faut pas chercher dans ces conférences publiées des discussions très poussées, des analyses de détail, sauf peut-être dans le cas de Suarez et de sa critériologie où on lui oppose une certaine interprétation du thomisme un peu figée, à ce qu'il nous semble. Les pages consacrées à Raymond Lulle nous semblent par contre plus éclairantes, orientant l'esprit vers de nouvelles recherches. Au total, le livre pourra inciter quelques chercheurs à suivre les pistes qui sont dessinées ici; en tout cas, il contribue à l'histoire de ce monde, quand même un peu restreint, de la scolastique et de ses cadres.~~

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~~ESSAI SUR L'AGIR HUMAIN. Par JOSEPH DE FINANCE. Rome,  
Presses de l'Université Grégorienne, 1962. 444 pages.~~

~~Cet Essai sur l'agir humain fait suite à la série des ouvrages remarquables déjà publiés par Joseph De Finance: *Être et agir* (1946 et 1960),~~